Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions by Lebens Samuel

Author:Lebens, Samuel
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)

The correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement.)

(Wittgenstein, 1961, 5.422)

We also know that Russell’s 1913 attempt to block this concern with logical forms was unsuccessful. To do the work required of them, logical forms would have to be, paradoxically, both simple and complex.

So we do know what some of Wittgenstein’s ongoing concerns were even if we can’t reconstruct the conversations he had with Russell in May 1913. The next section deals with an historical question that is much easier to answer: why did Russell eventually abandon the MRTJ? The question is easier to answer because it has less to do with Wittgenstein than is generally noted.

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